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Abstract 
Opposing the idea that individual preferences for decision styles (intuitive vs. deliberative) are 
relatively stable across decision domains, Pachur and Spaar (2015) show that individuals prefer 
different decision styles depending on the domain of the decision (e.g., mate choice vs. buying 
electronics). In this commentary, we seek to expand upon these results by considering why 
individuals might favor one style over another across different domains. Drawing upon previous 
work, we suggest that the characteristics related to the structure of the environment (i.e., pattern 
of information available) and individual-based factors (e.g., expertise, importance of decision, 
risk perception) can help distinguish different decision domains. Moreover, we suggest that these 
differences can help uncover how different decision domains engender different decision styles. 
Unpacking Decision Domains 
In “Domain-specific preferences for intuition and deliberation in decision making” by 
Pachur and Spaar (2015), the authors hypothesize that individual preferences for decision styles 
(intuitive vs. deliberative) might vary across decision domains, and as a function of the person’s 
self-perceived expertise within domains. To test this, participants were given a survey designed 
to capture tendencies for intuition vs. deliberation (adapted from Betsch & Iannello, in 
preparation) across six domains of everyday decision making. The survey also asked participants 
to report their expertise in making decisions within each of the domains. The results show that 
mean preferences for adopting an intuitive and deliberative decision style vary across domains 
(with a higher tendency for intuition within the domains of mate choice, clothing choice, and 
restaurant choice, a higher tendency for deliberation within the domains of buying electronic 
devices and choosing a doctor, and a null difference in decision style tendency for choosing a 
vacation destination). Additionally, the authors report high variability of decision style 
preferences for individuals across domains, as well as across individuals within each domain. 
This variability is partially explained by individuals’ self-reports of expertise for each domain, 
with a preference for intuition being positively correlated with self-reported expertise. As the 
authors conclude, these findings echo Simon’s (1987) argument that an effective decision maker 
chooses adaptively between the intuitive or analytic approach depending on the nature of the task 
at hand.  
Environmental structure and the environment-organism interaction 
In the current commentary, we explore the following question: What are the underlying 
differences between decision domains that elicit tendencies toward different decision styles? We 
suggest that the taxonomy of decision task characteristics proposed by Hammond and colleagues 
(e.g., Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987) can provide a useful starting point for 
analyzing the environmental structure of everyday decision domains. This taxonomy includes (1) 
number of cues, (2) measurement of cues (i.e., objective and reliable vs. inferred), (3) 
distribution (i.e., variability) of cue values, (4) redundancy among cues, (5) decomposition of the 
task (i.e., how easily the task can be simplified), (6) degree of certainty, (7) relation between 
cues and criterion, (8) weighting of cues in the environmental model, (9) availability of 
organizing principle, (10) display of cues (simultaneous vs. sequential), and (11) time period for 
decision making. In general, the taxonomy of task characteristics espoused by Hammond et al. 
follows a Brunswikian systems approach (Brunswik, 1957), which suggests that decision making 
or behavior in general can be seen as a function of the interaction between the properties of the 
organism and the environment. This approach fits well with the results of Pachur and Spaar 
(2015) since they show that decision styles vary in accordance with expertise: an important 
interaction between the organism and its decision environment.  
 Another related approach to characterizing decision domains follows the notion of 
ecological rationality (e.g., Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012), which suggests that strategy choice is not 
only a function of the task characteristics (e.g., availability and usefulness of information, 
number of decision alternatives), but likewise born out of the constraints of the decision maker’s 
capacity (e.g., perceptual, attentional, and memory limitations). Todd and Gigerenzer (2012) 
suggest uncertainty and redundancy as important characteristics of the environment. Both 
uncertainty and redundancy can be described in terms of cue validities (i.e., the strength of the 
cue’s predictive relationship with the criterion) for cues available when solving a decision task. 
For instance, the decision domain for a judgment can be assumed to exhibit high uncertainty if 
the cues hold weak relationships with the decision criterion. In other words, even if there is a 
plethora of information available to use as cues for a given judgment, if the validities of these 
cues are low, the decision maker will face a high level of uncertainty. Additionally, a decision 
domain is assumed to feature high redundancy if the relevant cues are highly correlated. That is, 
some of the cues are redundant if their relationship with the decision criterion is captured by, and 
interchangeable with, another cue. According to this framework, simple heuristics that rely on 
only one cue tend to be effective in environments with moderate to high uncertainty (Hogarth & 
Karelaia, 2007) and moderate to high redundancy (Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007; for an 
overview see Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Indeed, within the judgment and decision-making 
literature, there is evidence that people adapt their choice of strategy to characteristics of the 
environment (e.g., redundancy, Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007; variability of cue validities, 
Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; or task complexity, Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2016), and 
to their mental capacities (e.g., memory ability, Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2014; or 
processing capacity, Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007). 
Expertise and other individual-based factors 
Experience and expertise are both important individual-based factors that relate to 
understanding decision styles. Importantly, it is not experience alone that makes the expert: The 
findings of Pachur and Spaar (2015) suggest that the frequency of decisions within a particular 
domain cannot be the only factor that determines differences in self-reported expertise (p. 309). 
As the authors point out, these findings coincide with Hogarth (2001), who distinguished 
between “kind” and “wicked” environments (see also Shanteau & Thomas, 2000). Robust 
learning, and hence the development of expertise, develops in environments where feedback is 
accurate, timely, and readily available.  
Meaningful differences among decision domains can also be understood by observing the 
performance of experts. In which domains do experts perform well, and in which do experts 
hover just above chance? From this perspective, Shanteau (1992; 2015) provides a useful 
framework for characterizing decision domains based on factors that are assumed to increase 
expert performance, such as stable stimuli (static vs. dynamic), decisions about physical systems 
(vs. behavioral systems), expert agreement on relevant cues, predictability of context, error 
tolerance, repetition, available feedback, a decomposable problem, and use of decision aids. An 
important pattern that emerges from Shanteau’s characterization of domains is that the domains 
in which experts perform best are typically computer-aided or relatively “friendly” environments 
(e.g., Shanteau & Thomas, 2000) because the cue-criterion relationships are easily detected, 
stable over time, or perhaps bolstered with feedback. 
In addition to task characteristics related to the environmental structure of information 
available and how expertise may emerge depending on the particular environmental structure, 
other work has focused on separating out more individual-based (or situational) factors such as 
risk preference, risk perception, or gender (e.g., Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Blais & Weber 2001). 
Additionally, within another commentary of Pachur and Spaar’s paper, Szászi (in press) 
discusses the importance of disentangling the influence of domain-specific preferences and 
expertise upon the tendency for people to adopt different decision styles. Related to individual-
based factors, Pachur and Spaar (2015) conducted a pretest to gauge the subjective importance of 
different decision domains along with individuals’ subjective expertise. The purpose of this 
pretest was to create a selection of domains that varied based on importance and expertise. As 
mentioned below, we suggest that further work could seek to manipulate factors such as 
importance or risk perception within a particular decision scenario. For example, while holding 
the decision options and available information constant (e.g., deciding among vacation 
destinations), one could manipulate the importance of the decision (e.g., choosing a honeymoon 
vacation vs. a weekend trip). 
Incorporating and manipulating domain characteristics 
It is worth noting that specifying the properties of everyday decision domains is not an 
easy task, especially when one considers that, despite the objective properties of the 
environment, individuals vary in how information is attended, represented, and used for decision 
making. Thus, we do not eschew the broad-level survey approach adopted by Pachur and Spaar. 
However, for future efforts, we suspect that their approach can be bolstered in at least three 
ways. First, instead of asking participants to imagine a recent decision from a particular domain, 
more specific decision scenarios can be presented. This would help to minimize the variability of 
the decision scenarios imagined by participants, which have varying environmental 
characteristics. For example, within the domain of purchasing clothing, one participant might 
imagine buying socks while another might imagine buying a wedding dress.  Second, presenting 
more specific decision scenarios also affords researchers the opportunity to manipulate 
characteristics of the decision task. Thus, it is likely the case that decision styles vary, not only 
across different domains, but also within domains, depending on certain characteristics. Third, 
we also suggest expanding the survey instrument to include questions regarding the available 
knowledge (e.g., uncertainty or redundancy) about a particular decision scenario. For instance, 
after presenting participants with a decision scenario, one might ask them to list certain cues they 
would use to make their decision. The structure of the environment in relation to possible cues 
and their respective validities is well explored for some decision tasks, such as inferring the 
population size of cities (e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). It would also be worthwhile to 
structure other everyday decision domains along these lines (e.g. defining what might be possible 
cues, what their weights are, how much variance there is in the cues’ values across options, and 
how much variance there is in the average payoffs of different strategies). 
Comparing decision domain characteristics: Choosing a mate and buying a computer 
We now consider which task characteristics might be informative for the pattern of 
results across the decision domains used by Pachur and Spaar (2015). While reporting equal 
levels of experience in both domains, it was found that mate choice led to the highest self-
reported rate for adopting an intuitive decision style, whereas purchasing electronics led to the 
highest self-reported rate for adopting a deliberative decision style. Why is this so? These 
decision domains are likely highly different in terms of environmental structure and personal 
meaning for the participants. Regarding the environmental structure, much work has focused on 
identifying the important factors for mate choice (see Miller & Todd, 1998, for a review). Within 
the domain of mate choice, studies have revealed a wide array of subtle, sometimes non-linear, 
interacting, and dynamic cues from different areas (e.g., cultural, physical, personality) that are 
potentially integrated for decision making. Because of this complex pattern of information, we 
suspect, in general, a high level of uncertainty within the domain of mate choice. Contrasting 
with mate choice, when purchasing electronics it is often the case that the specifications of 
decision alternatives are readily available (for instance, on a website) and the usefulness of these 
cues is often well defined (e.g., computer processing speed or memory capacity). Thus, it is 
likely that there is far less uncertainty within the decision domain of purchasing electronics 
compared to mate choice. Additionally, related to the situational or individual-based factors, the 
importance of choosing a mate is presumably higher than purchasing electronics. Thus, even 
with only importance and uncertainty included as additional self-report measures, meaningful 
patterns would likely emerge across decision domains. 
Conclusion 
 What, other than differences in expertise, might be driving the differences of decision 
styles across domains? There are many possible avenues for following up on the results of 
Pachur and Spaar (2015) to investigate this. We suggest that efforts to characterize different 
decision scenarios, between and within domains, according to the environmental structure and 
individual-based factors can help illuminate why individuals adopt certain decision styles for 
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